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ARTICLES
MIRANDA ABUSE AND FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS UNDER THE MASSACHUSETTS
CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE XII IN NONCUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AND EVIDENCE
OF PRIOR BAD ACTS, TWO CASE STUDIES
MARISSA ELKINS*
“We have consistently held that [Article XII] requires a broader
interpretation than that of the Fifth Amendment.”1
INTRODUCTION
When it comes to protecting the rights of the criminally accused,
the Federal Constitution and federal law provide minimum basic
safeguards below which no law enforcement or judicial act in any U.S.
civilian jurisdiction may venture, but Massachusetts has long protected
the rights of the accused more stringently than federal law requires. In
particular, Article XII of the Declaration of Rights has long been held to
offer certain protections that the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court of the United States, does not.2
* Marissa Elkins is the founding partner of Elkins Law Group, LLC in Northampton,
Massachusetts, a practice focusing primarily on criminal defense and civil rights
litigation. She is president of the Hampshire County Bar Association and serves on the Board
of Directors and as vice-chair of the Indigent Defense Committee of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. She earned her juris doctorate from the University of
Connecticut School of Law and her bachelor of arts from Austin College. She thanks Josh
Wolk, J.D., Boston University and Alice Kundl, ant. J.D., Western New England University
for their invaluable assistance with this article.
1. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 (1992) (quoting
Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 444 N.E.2d 915 (1982)).
2. Article XII of the Massachusetts State Constitution, which is analogous to the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, reads as follows:
No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is
fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described to him; or be compelled
to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself. And every subject shall have a
right to produce all proofs that may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses
against him face to face, and to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his
council at his election. And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled,
or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of
211
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Two cases recently before the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts (hereinafter “SJC”) have provided opportunities to
consider subtle wrinkles in the protections offered by Article XII for
rights of the criminally accused.3 Both cases involve the admissibility of
evidence against the criminal defendant, one dealing with evidence
gathered in police interrogations, and the other dealing with evidence of
prior bad acts, or so-called “404(b)” evidence. By the time this article is
printed these cases will likely have been decided, but both present issues
with significant nuance and their consideration is useful for the criminal
practitioner beyond the issue of their specific resolutions.
In the first case, Commonwealth v. Libby,4 the question is whether
the issuing of a Miranda5 warning by police, and their subsequent
request that a suspect waive the rights listed in that warning, affects the
rights of a person being questioned.6 More specifically, when a suspect
is arguably not in police custody (and, recall, whether someone is in
custody can be a tricky question about which courts perform a multifactor post hoc analysis) can a Miranda warning and a police request for
a waiver of the protected rights indicate that the questioning has become
custodial?
The United States Supreme Court has failed to clarify whether
police, after reciting the Miranda warning, have a duty to honor Miranda
rights in noncustodial interviews.
Since some of those rights
(particularly the right to court-appointed counsel) do not apply unless a
person has been arrested, the Miranda warning can be confusingly
inaccurate when recited to those who are not under arrest. This has
the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land.
MASS. CONST., art. XII.
3. The two cases are Commonwealth v. Dorazio, and Commonwealth v. Libby. Amicus
Announcements, MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM, http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legalres/case-information/amicus-announcements/ (last visited June 28, 2015).
4. Amicus
Announcements,
November
2014
Announcements,
SJC-11749
Commonwealth
vs.
Jeremy
Libby,
MASSACHUSETTS
COURT
SYSTEM,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/case-information/amicus-announcements/
(last
visited June 28, 2015).
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This case established a number of rights
for individuals in police custody and subject to police interrogation.
6. See the Massachusetts SJC’s Amicus Announcements, requesting amicus briefs
addressing the issue of whether “[i]n a noncustodial interrogation, where an individual has
been given Miranda warnings, . . . the police interrogators are required ‘to honor scrupulously
[the individual’s] invocation of his or her Miranda rights.’” Amicus Announcements,
November 2014 Announcements, SJC-11749 Commonwealth vs. Jeremy Libby,
MASSACHUSETTS
COURT
SYSTEM,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/caseinformation/amicus-announcements/ (last visited June 28, 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Baye, 967 N.E.2d 1120, 1134 (2012)).
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created a morass of conflicting approaches across jurisdictions about the
extent of federal protection. Federal and state courts across the country
have attempted to discern what effect, if any, the administration of
Miranda warnings in noncustodial situations may have. Section I of this
article will argue that Article XII requires that invocations of Miranda
rights made during noncustodial interrogations be honored.
The second Article XII case recently before the SJC,
Commonwealth v. Dorazio, has to do with evidence of prior bad acts, or
so-called “404(b)” evidence.7 At one point federal law was understood
to prevent the admission of evidence of criminal activity for which the
suspect was previously acquitted under some combination of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the rules of evidence, and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Those days ended in 1990 when the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled in Dowling v. United States that the failure of the
state to convict under a reasonable doubt standard did not mean that
evidence of the earlier conviction was inadmissible in subsequent
proceedings given the lower standard for admissibility, propensity of the
evidence, for other evidentiary purposes. Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), and its Massachusetts counterpart, prevent the admission of such
evidence for the purpose of showing the propensity to commit a later
crime, but can allow the evidence for other purposes such as showing
that an alleged criminal act was not a mistake, that the defendant was
indeed the person who perpetrated the crime, or that the defendant had
the necessary mens rea for the act to be criminal, among other reasons, if
its probative value sufficiently outweighs any unfair prejudice to the
defendant.
Even under Dowling the admission of such evidence can still be
collaterally estopped if it can be shown that the proceeding that led to the
earlier acquittal necessarily determined that the criminal act did not
occur, or that the accused was not the actor. In practice such estoppel is
rare, even where acquittals are based on evidence of innocence, because
criminal courts usually issue general verdicts and not specific findings.
To deny such evidence on collateral estoppel grounds a court must

7. See the Massachusetts SJC’s request for briefs addressing the issue of whether
“[w]here the prosecution offers evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts – for which he was
tried in an earlier case and acquitted – to prove ‘common scheme, pattern of operation,
absence of accident or mistake, intent, or motive’ in the current case, . . . the defendant is
entitled to any greater protection under State law than under Federal law to prevent admission
of this evidence.” Amicus Announcements, December 2014 Announcements, SJC-11765
Commonewealth
vs.
Herbert
Dorazio,
MASSACHUSETTS
COURT
SYSTEM,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/case-information/amicus-announcements/
(last
visited June 28, 2015) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990)).

ELKINS DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

214

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

8/4/15 9:55 AM

[Vol. 37:211

consider the record of the previous proceeding to determine if the
acquittal could have rested on other grounds, such as a mere failure of
the prosecution to overcome the reasonable doubt hurdle. But if a
person has been acquitted of a crime in the distant past, and no
significant record of the proceeding exists, this determination is not just
unlikely—it is impossible. Indeed, the record of the previous proceeding
will often be insufficient because the defendant was acquitted.8
Under such circumstances it is fundamentally unfair for evidence of
the alleged prior bad act to be admitted and Article XII’s due process
protections should prevent it from being heard by the jury. This is a
narrow issue, and does not require the SJC to rule contrary to the
Dowling analysis in a general way. Rather, protecting the criminal
defendant’s due process rights in this case merely requires the court to
find that, in circumstances where the criminal defendant would be
required to dig up a skimpy or non-existent record of proceedings from
the distant past in order to attempt to suppress evidence of crimes for
which he was long ago acquitted, it is a violation of Article XII’s due
process protections, i.e., protections against fundamentally unfair
process, to allow the evidence.
This article will argue that Article XII protects the criminal suspect
in both of these situations.
I. THE DANGERS OF MIRANDA WARNINGS IN NOMINALLY NONCUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
The Miranda warning is intended to ensure that people in police
custody are aware of their right against self-incrimination and their right
to an attorney. The warning provides some protection against the
coercive effects of police interrogation and serves to limit tactics police
may use to gain incriminating evidence from those who might otherwise
be unaware of their rights. But what effect does it have on a criminal
suspect to be told of the rights and then have those rights ignored?
An interlocutory appeal on a Motion to Suppress recently argued
before the SJC in the case Commonwealth v. Jeremy Libby involved
exactly this situation. Mr. Libby was suspected of a crime and brought
to the police station for questioning. Though he was not placed under
arrest he was read his Miranda rights and asked to sign a waiver of those
rights. Because he was not under arrest, and was arguably not legally in
police custody, the Miranda warning was not necessarily required, but
police issued it anyway. Police solicited a waiver of those rights, but

8. See Section II infra for expanded discussion of this.
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prior to signing, Mr. Libby attempted to invoke the right to courtappointed counsel about which he had just heard. His invocation was
ignored and Mr. Libby was pressured to waive and to continue talking
with the implication that he might be arrested if he did not cooperate.
The police released him after the interview, but arrested him the next
day, though they had no significant additional evidence. Again the
police issued Miranda warnings and asked Mr. Libby to sign a waiver,
which he did. Again he invoked his right to court-appointed counsel and
was pressured to continue talking, this time with indications that he
might get lesser charges if he did not ask for an attorney.
It is the defendant’s position that the motion judge correctly ruled
that the second interview was custodial, that Miranda rights were in full
effect, and that the interrogation was inadmissible evidence because of
the improper police tactics. But what about the first interview when Mr.
Libby had come to the police station voluntarily? The motion judge
ruled that evidence of the first interview was also inadmissible–that Mr.
Libby’s statements were not voluntary because his will was overborne
by police. The Commonwealth appealed the motion judge’s ruling on
both interviews. The SJC sought amicii on the question of whether,
when police issue Miranda warnings in non-custodial interviews, they
must “scrupulously honor” invocations of Miranda rights.
Police interrogators are keenly aware of Miranda’s strictures and
have learned to conduct interviews in nominally non-custodial settings
specifically to avoid losing evidence through a court’s later application
of the Miranda rubric.9 In non-custodial situations police often issue the
Miranda warning to avoid a possible later ruling that the warning was
required and not given, but because the interrogation is likely to later be
ruled to have been non-custodial, police are significantly freer to ignore
invocations of Miranda and pressure the suspect to answer questions.10
In such situations the warning itself become part of the interrogator’s
toolkit, and can be used by police in various ways, outlined below, to
overcome a suspect’s desire to remain silent or to seek counsel while
police remain within the boundaries of the federal Miranda rubric.11
Being informed of rights and then immediately having those rights
ignored places the suspect in a confusing situation where she may feel
that she does not understand her position and is playing a dangerous

9. For a discussion of police practices designed to circumvent the rights guaranteed by
the Miranda warning, see Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises Miranda Warnings in
Noncustodial Interrogations, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1319-1328 (2012).
10. Id. at 1320-22.
11. Id. at 1319-28.
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game against seasoned players with no clear concept of the rules and no
reliable source of information about those rules.12 This crafty police
Miranda work-around is fundamentally unfair, and particularly so in the
case of the indigent defendant who requires help from the
Commonwealth in securing counsel, as will be shown below. The
Supreme Court of the United States has failed to articulate whether
police must honor the invocation of Miranda rights in nominally noncustodial settings after police have issued the warning, but Article XII
has historically protected the criminal defendant from such tactics, and
should do so here.
A. Miranda Under the Federal Constitution and Article XII
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”13 The Sixth Amendment provides that the
criminal defendant shall “have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”14 The United States Supreme Court recognized in Miranda v.
Arizona15 that these protections must extend to police custodial
interrogations because “without proper safeguards the process of incustody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely.”16 In light of the significant risk of coercion
present in custodial interrogation, “[p]rior to any questioning, the
[suspect] must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that
he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.”17
For any statement made during custodial interrogation to be
admissible against the defendant at trial, both the Federal and State
Constitutions require that the prosecution prove that the defendant
waived these rights before making the statement.18 The Commonwealth
bears the heavy burden of proving such waiver beyond a reasonable

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1325-28.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 444.
See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 651 N.E.2d 398, 400-01 (Mass. 1995).
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doubt.19 “A confession can be voluntary in the legal sense only if the
suspect actually understands the import of each Miranda warning,”20 and
is not “threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver.”21 In deciding
whether a defendant’s waiver of the rights described in the Miranda
warning is valid, “a court must examine the totality of the circumstances,
including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.”22
If a suspect in police custody invokes any of the rights enumerated
in Miranda, the invocation must be scrupulously honored.23 In an
instance where a suspect invokes his right to counsel, “all interrogation
must cease until counsel is made available, unless the defendant himself
reinitiates further communication with the police.”24 If an interrogation
is non-custodial, these protections do not apply.25
There are four factors that Massachusetts courts consider to
determine whether an interrogation is custodial:
(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have
conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that
that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including
whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and
influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4)
whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the
person was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the
interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by
26
whether the interview terminated with an arrest.

The SJC has held that “[t]here is no specific formula for weighing
the relevant factors” and that “[r]arely is any single factor conclusive.”27
Nevertheless, the seasoned defense attorney knows that when a suspect
is not placed under arrest it is very rare for an interrogation to be ruled
19. Commonwealth v. Dustin, 368 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (Mass. 1977); Commonwealth v.
Day, 444 N.E.2d 384, 386-87 (Mass. 1983).
20. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 399 N.E.2d 460, 466 (Mass. 1980).
21. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
22. Commonwealth v. Silva, 477 N.E.2d 646, 651 (Mass. 1983).
23. In order to protect the rights of the accused, “the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
24. Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 958 N.E.2d 834, 842 (Mass. 2011), citing Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–485 (1981).
25. “The requirements of Miranda . . . are not triggered unless the interrogation is
custodial.” Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, 394 (Mass. 2005).
26. Commonwealth v. Groome, 755 N.E.2d 1224, 1233-35 (Mass. 2001); see also
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 796 N.E.2d 1284, 1287-88 (Mass. 2003).
27. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 796 N.E. 2d 1284 (2003).
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custodial as long as police avoided being overtly aggressive.
Police know this as well. Mr. Libby’s case is illustrative of how
police interrogation tactics have transformed to accommodate the
Miranda strictures and still thwart the invocation of the rights Miranda
sought to protect. Though federal law has failed to keep up with this
change, Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights should
continue to protect criminal defendants more strictly than federal law, as
it has for decades.
B. Greater Protections Under Article XII
The Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution
predates and operates independently of the Federal Constitution.28 As a
result, Massachusetts has been a leader in expanding the protections of
its Constitution beyond the minimum standards set by the Federal
Constitution.29 Perhaps the first instance of this30 can be found in the
case of District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson,31 in which the
Massachusetts SJC invalidated Massachusetts’s death penalty statute,
finding that it was “offensive to contemporary standards of decency,”
“arbitrarily [and discriminatorily] inflicted,” and cruel and unusual under
the Declaration of Rights, although it may well have been acceptable
under the Federal Constitution.32 Article XII, in particular, has been
used to justify greater protection under the state constitution of the
privilege against self-incrimination, Sixth Amendment rights including
the right to counsel, and Miranda rights generally.33
In Commonwealth v. Mavredakis,34 the Massachusetts SJC
addressed the distinction between Article XII of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights and the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as they pertain to self-incrimination:
[t]he text of art. 12, as it relates to self-incrimination, is broader than
the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, states:

28. Robert J. Cordy, Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 815, 820 (2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Upton (Upton III), 476 N.E.2d 548,
556 (Mass. 1985)).
29. Id. at 815-16.
30. Id. at 818.
31. 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980).
32. Id.
33. Robert J. Cordy, Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 815, 826-33 (2011). See also Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249
(Mass. 1982) (“The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights can . . . provide greater safeguards
than the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.”).
34. 725 N.E.2d 169 (Mass. 2000).
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“Nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.” Article 12, however, commands that “No
subject shall. . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against
himself.” Based on the textual differences between art. 12 and the
Fifth Amendment, we have “consistently held that art. 12 requires a
broader interpretation [of the right against self-incrimination] than
35
that of the Fifth Amendment.”

The breadth of Article XII has long been established in
Massachusetts case law:
By the narrowest construction, this prohibition extends to all
investigations of an inquisitorial nature, instituted for the purpose of
discovering crime, or the perpetrators of crime, by putting suspected
parties upon their examination in respect thereto, in any manner;
36
although not in the course of any pending prosecution.

Massachusetts courts have not hesitated to adopt additional rules
under the Massachusetts Constitution to secure the broader guarantee
against self-incrimination afforded by Article XII when Federal law has
been found insufficient for the purpose.37 In articulating these additional
safeguards, the courts have considered “the need to deter police from
ignoring the requirements of Miranda where doing so would provide
police with a greater chance of obtaining incriminating evidence” an
important factor.38 “Another factor that has motivated [the Court] to
depart from Federal decisions is the need to preserve bright-line rules in
the Miranda context.”39
Massachusetts courts have most often felt compelled to articulate
additional rules to secure Article XII protections when they have “been
confronted by shrinking protections afforded to the Federal right against
self-incrimination” in light of specific rulings by the United States
Supreme Court.40
C. Miranda and the Right to Counsel in the Non-Custodial Setting
Though the prophylactic protections of Miranda apply only in the
35. Id. at 178-79 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1210 (1992)
(quoting Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 796 (1982))).
36. In re Emery, 107 Mass. 172, 181 (1871).
37. See Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 303 (2010) (Botsford, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 292.
39. Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 294 (2010), citing Commonwealth v.
Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 223 (2005); Commonwealth v. Smith, 412 Mass. 823, 836-837 (1992)
(holding that “one of the purposes of the ‘bright-line’ Miranda rule” is “to avoid fact-bound
inquiries into the voluntariness of confessions.”).
40. Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 221 (2005).
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custodial situation,41 the rights articulated by the standard Miranda
warning are generally guaranteed at all times by the United States
Constitution and Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.42 Citizens retain
at all times their right to remain silent in the face of governmental
accusation and to the assistance of counsel in asserting that right.43
Custody is not required for invocation of these rights.44 Rather, an
individual’s status as in custody or not presently under arrest dictates the
means available to the accused to invoke his or her rights.
In a noncustodial situation where Miranda warnings have been
given, Article XII should require police to honor scrupulously an
individual’s invocation of her Miranda rights. It is the United States
Supreme Court’s failure to clarify that has created ambiguity regarding
the extent of Federal protection. In the absence of guidance from the
Supreme Court, courts in various jurisdictions have struggled to discern
what effect, if any, the administration of Miranda warnings in
noncustodial situations may have.
An individual who is not in custody, and who understands that she
is free to leave at any time, may invoke her right to silence or to seek the
assistance of counsel not only by saying so and affirmatively refusing to
answer any further questions, but also by leaving the place of
interrogation and obtaining counsel. On the other hand, an indigent
individual’s ability to invoke the right to counsel for pre-arraignment
questioning may only be effectuated with the assistance of the
Commonwealth.45 If, in fact, the police cannot honor such an invocation
and actually provide counsel, the individual must be told as much and
the interrogation should end without further cajoling and attempts to
coerce the individual into recanting the invocation. Absent these
affirmative measures, the right to the assistance of counsel as guaranteed

41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-475 (1966).
42. See Robert J. Cordy, Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 45
NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 828-29 (2011).
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (holding that the right to be free
from self-incrimination and the assistance of counsel are “precious rights . . . fixed in our
Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle . . . secured ‘for ages to come,
and designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.’”)
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 387; 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)). See also
Commonwealth v. Sazama, 339 Mass. 154, 157 (1959) (holding that Article 12 guarantees
that “[a] man, being interrogated under circumstances which reveal that he is suspected of a
crime, even if not under arrest, certainly may properly assert his constitutional right to consult
counsel and may refuse, on the advice of counsel or otherwise, to make statements.”)
44. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966); Commonwealth v. Sazama, 339
Mass. 152, 156-57 (1959).
45. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 211D, §§ 5, 8.
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by the Fifth Amendment and Article XII has no force or meaning to the
indigent person accused, but not yet formally charged, with a crime. A
failure to honor these protections may also discourage individuals
subject to police questioning from attempting to assert their rights in the
present interview or in the future.46
Many courts have chosen not to deter the issuing of the warning by
holding that the warning has no legal effect on the rights of a person who
is not in police custody. Specifically, if a suspect is given the warning
when not in custody, and then requests appointed counsel, police in
many jurisdictions can ignore the request and continue asking
substantive questions and developing evidence that will be admissible in
court. In Massachusetts the SJC has held that, where a person being
questioned is in police custody and invokes the right to counsel, police
must cease asking substantive questions and must limit further
questioning to the issue of whether the arrestee is refusing to answer
further questions without counsel present.47 But where a person is not in
custody, police have no such duty in Massachusetts, at least not as of this
writing.48 In other words, the police can inform a person that they have a
right to appointed counsel and then ignore an attempted invocation of
that right and continue pressing for substantive answers.
Courts generally cleave to this rule on the theory that police should
not be deterred from informing people of their rights in situations where
the law does not necessarily require them to be so informed. Police, it is
argued, should not have to explain (and may not even understand, or so
this argument leads us to believe) the nuances of the custody analysis,
and should be encouraged to err on the side of caution and give the
warning. This argument implies that more information about rights
cannot be anything but good for the criminally accused. What this
analysis fails to consider is the effect it may have on a suspect to be told
of certain rights, and then to have those rights immediately ignored.49 At
a minimum, it is confusing. But more worrisome, perhaps, is the fact
that police can be savvy enough to use this confusion to their advantage,
and to the suspect’s detriment.
46. See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 350 (2012) (quoting Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 472-473 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (“When a suspect understands
his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored . . . in contravention of the ‘rights’ just read to
him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not)
as the only way to end his interrogation.”)).
47. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 341-45 (2012).
48. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 597, 608 (2005).
49. Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial
Interrogations, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1320-21 (2012).
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As others have argued, a common police strategy is to intentionally
keep an interrogation nominally non-custodial for strategic purposes.50
That is, knowing the legal hallmarks of custody, police can narrowly
avoid creating a legally custodial situation, issue Miranda warnings,
seek a waiver of the Miranda rights, and then try to gather as much
information as possible (or get the suspect on the record telling a false
story). Though the suspect may feel compelled to answer questions (as
Mr. Libby did due to the threat of arrest if he did not cooperate) the
police maintain the non-custodial status of the interview by telling the
suspect he is not under arrest at that time. In such a scenario, the
Miranda warning serves the opposite of its intended purpose. Rather
than informing the person of his rights so that he may exercise them, the
reading of the rights serves to cause the person to feel significantly
intimidated. Though told he is not under arrest, he is read his rights - a
hallmark of police process of the criminally charged. Furthermore, when
he tries to exercise those rights, he finds himself in the Kafkaesque
situation of having had rights explained and then ignored by the
functionary who just explained them.
Further, suppose this routine occurs in more than one interrogation
with the same suspect, as it did with Mr. Libby. In the first interrogation
Mr. Libby was informed of his rights and had those rights ignored; he
requested an attorney but police keep asking questions anyway and
indicating that if he didn’t answer there would be negative
consequences. Eventually the police convinced him that it is in his
interest to answer some questions, and he signed a waiver of his
Miranda rights, and answered. Even though the interrogation occurred
with many of the trappings of a custodial interrogation, i.e., at the police
station with Mr. Libby the obvious focus of the police investigation, the
interrogation was likely to be ruled noncustodial. But the questioning
did not lead to immediate arrest, and Mr. Libby was allowed to leave at
the end of the interview. Then, less than twenty-four hours later, after a
sleepless night wondering if he would be arrested, Mr. Libby was indeed
arrested and interrogated again.
In the second interrogation Mr. Libby was unquestionably in
custody–he had been arrested. He was again informed of his rights and
asked to sign a waiver. Any suspect in Mr. Libby’s situation couldn’t
help but be affected by the events of the day before. Having been
through the same routine less than twenty-four hours earlier a suspect is
now likely to sign a waiver more readily, particularly if police make it

50. See id. at 1320-29.
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seem like some benefit will accrue if he does. Imagine the police say
something like, “We haven’t decided what to charge you with yet, and
you can still help yourself in this situation, but if you ask for an attorney,
this interview is over,” as they did in Mr. Libby’s case.
The suspect has no reason to believe that his rights are different in
this second interrogation from those he had the day before when he was
told he had the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present but
the police kept pushing him to answer. Suppose the suspect, confused
and fearful that he will miss some opportunity to cooperate and get lesser
charges, again answers the police questions. Without protection from
Article XII, these answers are admissible evidence. The various rights
that protect the suspect against self-incrimination have been thwarted
and the Miranda warning itself has played a significant role in
establishing the intimidation and confusion necessary to make this
successful.
The officer questioning Mr. Libby may well have, by design,
sought to question him in the most coercive setting available while still
maintaining a “nominally noncustodial” situation.51 Additionally, police
deploy on a regular basis a number of tactics that serve to ensure that the
administration of Miranda warnings operates to their benefit in the
investigation rather than to serve a suspect’s guaranteed rights.52 These
tactics have a “corrosive effect on [the broader rights embodied in
Article XII], undermine the respect [this Court] ha[s] accorded them, and
demean their importance to a system of justice chosen by the citizens of
Massachusetts in 1780.”53
What effect should the police’s actions in the first interview issuing Miranda warnings, requesting a waiver of Miranda rights,
ignoring attempted invocations of those rights - have on the admissibility
of evidence from the second interview? Are police savvy enough to use
this set of circumstances to their advantage? If you think not, you have
likely not read many transcripts of police interviews of suspects. How
can Article XII prevent this without forcing police to second-guess
whether Miranda warnings are appropriate in custodial grey areas? The
51. Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial
Interrogations, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (2012).
52. Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial
Interrogations, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1320-1322 (2012)(detailing a number of coercive
police tactics including conducting formal interviews in “noncustodial environments,”
administering Miranda warnings but downplaying their significance, and reminding suspects
that they are not required to talk not as a warning, but in an effort to engender trust with a
suspect).
53. Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Mass. 2005).
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following section offers a suggested rule that would solve the problem.
Troubling police interrogation practices designed to elude the
strictures of Miranda have given Massachusetts courts considerable
pause in the past.54 Article XII’s broad protection against selfincrimination and guarantee of the right to the assistance of counsel,
extending as it does “to all investigations of an inquisitorial nature, . . .
putting suspected parties upon their examination in respect thereto, in
any manner”55 even when “not in the course of any pending
prosecution”56 demand fairer treatment.”57
D. A Road Forward: The Administration of Miranda Warnings
Coupled with the Solicitation of a Waiver of Those Rights Should
Create a Rebuttable Presumption of Custody for the Purposes of
Miranda.
Sanctioning the police practice of ignoring a suspect’s invocation of
rights guaranteed by Article XII in any situation—particularly where the
suspect has been advised of those rights and waiver was explicitly
sought—is an anathema to the Commonwealth’s Constitution. The
existing jurisprudence surrounding the admissibility of statements under
voluntariness standards and Miranda offer a number of potential roads
forward.58 It appears that only one jurisdiction has adopted a blanket
rule that where Miranda has been given, any invocation of those rights
must be honored regardless of custody status or voluntariness.59
Among the potential rules that Massachusetts courts could articulate
to address situations such as the one experienced by Mr. Libby, courts
could consider adopting a rebuttable presumption of custody where

54. Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58, 71 (Mass. 2010).
55. In re Emery, 107 Mass. 172, 181 (1871).
56. Id.
57. Other states’ constitutions provide such protection. For example, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court has construed that state’s constitution to require police to honor an
invocation of the right to counsel even in the absence of Miranda warnings. See State v.
Tapply, 470 A.2d 900 904 (N.H. 1983)(construing article 15 of the New Hampshire Bill of
Rights).
58. See Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial
Interrogations, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1328-39 (2012) (detailing a number of potential
treatments of the administration of Miranda warnings in noncustodial situations).
59. Ex parte Comer, 591 So.2d 13, 15-16 (Ala. 1991). Here, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that “once a police officer informs a person of his or her rights under Miranda, the
police must honor that person’s exercise of those rights even if the individual is not in
custody” due to “‘the coercive effect of continued interrogation’” and the likelihood that this
would cause a person to believe that police could and would continue to violate the person’s
constitutional rights. Id. (quoting Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 516 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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Miranda warnings are administered and waiver is explicitly sought.60
Most significantly, this solution fits squarely in the Miranda rubric,
which emphasizes the coercive circumstance that arises when people are
unsure of their custody status—a situation that can be purposefully
manipulated by police. Also, it provides the kind of bright-line rule
favored by the Court in dealing with Miranda issues, especially where
the Court is articulating a higher Article XII standard.61 Finally, to the
extent the issue could be considered an open question under federal law,
this solution does not assume or foreclose on the possibility that this
kind of improper police practice may still be a violation of federal law as
well.
Applied to circumstances such as the ones experienced by Mr.
Libby, a rebuttable presumption of custody would be impossible for the
Commonwealth to overcome given the many factors already present
supporting custody, particularly the extended clash of wills sparked by
Mr. Libby’s invocation of right to counsel.62
II. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE XII AND THE ADMISSION OF
ACQUITTED CONDUCT AS PRIOR BAD ACT EVIDENCE
The SJC has taken up Commonwealth v. Dorazio,63 for Further
Appellate Review to examine whether Article XII requires greater
protection than federal law regarding the treatment of previously
acquitted conduct when the Commonwealth seeks to introduce the prior
allegations as “404(b)” evidence.64 Specifically, the case presents the
60. Maoz favors a rebuttable presumption of custody as well (though without the
requirement that explicit waiver be sought to trigger it) as a solution for the current morass of
federal law surrounding this situation. She argues, “this approach most closely aligns with the
[Supreme] Court’s current approach and the evidence indicating a strong association between
the Miranda warnings and formal arrest . . . .” Aurora Maoz, Empty Promises Miranda
Warnings in Noncustodial Interrogations, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1329 (May 2012)
61. Commonwealth v. Martin, 444 Mass. 213, 223 (2005).
62. See Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 172 n.1 (1985) (noting that “[t]here are . . .
circumstances where a clash of wills over a suspect’s desire to remain silent would create
custody through overbearing police behavior.”) (emphasis added).
63. Commonwealth v. Dorazio, No. SJC-11765, WL 541595 (Mass. 2005).
64. Mass. Guide to Evidence, §404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, nature of relationship, or absence of mistake or
accident.”). Though the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence is not a set of formally adopted
rules, the Guide has been promulgated by the SJC Advisory Committee on Massachusetts
Evidence Law with the goal of “reflect[ing] the most accurate and clear statement of current
law as possible. Ultimately, the law of evidence in Massachusetts is what is contained in the
authoritative decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court and of the Appeals Court, and the
statutes duly enacted by the Legislature.” Introduction to the 2014 Edition, SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-
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question, “[w]here the prosecution offers evidence of a defendant’s prior
bad acts—for which he was tried in an earlier case and acquitted—to
prove ‘common scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or
mistake, intent, or motive’ in the current case . . . [whether] the
defendant is entitled to any greater protection under State law than under
Federal law to prevent admission of this evidence.”65 In other words, is
there any continuing vitality, in Massachusetts (to be found under Article
XII’s due process guarantees or elsewhere, of the collateral estoppel
doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ashe
v. Swenson66 after it has been considerably narrowed in criminal cases
under federal constitutional law in a subsequent case, Dowling v. United
States?67
In Dorazio, the defendant was convicted in 2010 of sexual crimes
against two children who came forward with allegations more than ten
years after the abuse allegedly occurred. At the trial, the Commonwealth
introduced evidence that in 1998 the defendant had been accused of
inappropriately touching another child in a Chuck E. Cheese restaurant
(the “CEC evidence”). The defendant, however, had been acquitted of
charges related to those allegations after a jury trial twelve years prior to
the second trial.68 His appeal argued, in pertinent part, that the evidence
of the crime for which he had been acquitted should not have been
allowed.
Despite the Supreme Court’s Dowling decision, Massachusetts
should honor the spirit of the collateral estoppel doctrine, particularly in
cases where, as in Dorazio, it is impossible to determine (because of an

res/guidelines/mass-guide-to-evidence/statement-from-the-supreme-judicial-court-andintroduction.html. “[I]t has been cited as a source of authority by the Appeals Court and by
the Supreme Judicial Court in both published and unpublished opinions more than 500 times
since it was first published in 2008.” Id.
65. See the Massachusetts SJC’s request for amicus briefs Amicus Announcements,
December 2014 Announcements, SJC-11765 Commonewealth vs. Herbert Dorazio,
MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM, http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/caseinformation/amicus-announcements/ (last visited June 28, 2015).
66. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
67. 493 U.S. 342 (1990). Prior to Dowling, a majority of federal circuits applied Ashe
to cases involving 404(b) evidence. See United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572,
583-84 (1st Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Cala, 521 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Salmone, 869 F.2d
221 (3d Cir. 1989)(reversed in light of Dowling); Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Johnson, 697 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1983); King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435 (8th
Cir. 1978); Buck v. Maschner, 878 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1989).
68. It was actually alleged in the 1998 trial that the defendant inappropriately touched
two girls, but the Commonwealth only sought to introduce evidence from one of the
complainants in 2010. This is a significant fact because the complainant they did not seek to
present in 2010 had not, in 1998, been able to produce testimony of any touching, which
surely played a significant role in the 1998 acquittals on all counts related to both girls.
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insufficient record of the earlier trial) whether the earlier acquittal was
based upon a determination that the defendant did not indeed commit the
acts alleged. The promise of fundamental fairness inherent in due
process guarantees in Article XII requires as much.
A. Unfair Prejudice and 404(B)
As an initial matter, under Massachusetts common law, extrinsic, or
more commonly, prior bad acts are not admissible at trial as proof of
unrelated allegations. In general, evidence of bad acts extrinsic to the
crime charged may not be offered solely for the prohibited purpose of
proving bad character and thus, inferentially, a propensity toward
crime.69 Extrinsic bad act evidence is only admissible if it is
“‘substantially relevant to the offense charged; [is] inadmissible when its
relevance is insignificant; and, in borderline cases, admissible when its
relevance outweighs the undue prejudice that may flow from it’”70
Bad act evidence, however, may be admissible if relevant to issues
of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
nature of relationship, or absence of mistake or accident.”71 These
exceptions, however, are not without limitation.72
Evidence of
uncharged sexual misconduct with a person other than the complainant
in a case involving a sexual crime is considered to be particularly
prejudicial and prone to misuse by a jury.73 For this reason, if such
evidence is to be admissible, it “must be closely related in time, place,
and form of acts to show a common course of conduct by the defendant
toward the [multiple alleged victims] so as to be logically probative.”74
“If the judge finds that the evidence in question meets the above
requirements, he or she next must determine whether its probative value
is outweighed by a risk of undue prejudice to the defendant.”75 If such
evidence is improperly admitted, it “‘diverts the attention of the jury
from the [crime] immediately before it; and, by showing the defendant to
have been a knave on other occasions, creates a prejudice which may

69. Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 793 (1994).
70. Commonwealth v. Yelle, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 465, 472 (1985) (citations omitted)
(noting that there is no discretion to admit evidence in the second category).
71. Mass. G. Evid. §404(b) (2013).
72. Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206 (1985).
73. Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 795 (1994).
74. Commonwealth v. Barret, 418 Mass. 788, 794 (1994). Accord Commonwealth v.
King, 387 Mass. 464, 472 (1994); Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Cokonougher, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 54, 58 (1992).
75. Barrett, 418 Mass. at 794 (1994).
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cause injustice to be done him.’”76
Introduction of evidence from a prior acquittal “imposes on the
defendant the burden of relitigating [that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor] and thereby increases the likelihood of an
erroneous conviction on the charged offense” that Article XII demands
that the Commonwealth be collaterally estopped from introducing such
evidence.77
[O]ne of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense
evidence is that the jury may convict the defendant not for the
offense charged but for the extrinsic offense. This danger is
particularly great where . . . the extrinsic activity was not the subject
of a conviction; the jury may feel the defendant should be punished
for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense charged.”
Alternatively, there is the danger that the evidence ‘may lead [the
jury] to conclude that, having committed a crime of the type charged,
78
[the defendant] is likely to repeat it.

Where such evidence is presented at trial, the defendant is faced
with the proposition of mounting a defense to an entirely different set of
highly inflammatory and prejudicial allegations than the ones for which
he is on trial. Even if possible to mount a defense,79 it is so
fundamentally unfair and contrary to any notion of due process that it
should never be allowed.80
B. Article VII’s Due Process Protections Should Prevent the Use of
Evidence of Prior Acquitted Acts Where Those Acts are Highly
Prejudicial and There is an Insufficient Record of the Previous Trial
to Ascertain Whether the Defendant was Innocent of the Earlier
Crime.
In Dorazio, the defendant has argued strenuously that it was a
violation of the his rights to due process of law and a fair trial as
76. Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 563 (1986) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 20–21 (1882)).
77. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 356 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Accord State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787 (N.Car. 1992). The United States Supreme Court has
held that because of the different standard of proof, the introduction of such evidence does not
violate the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution. Dowling, 492 U.S. at 351.
78. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 361-62 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (CA5 1978).
79. Mounting a defense to prior allegations becomes increasingly difficult with the
passage of time.
80. Accord McMichael v. State, 638 P.2d 402, 403 (Nev. 1982) (“[C]onsiderations of
fair play underlying the double jeopardy principle militate strongly against the . . .
admissibility [of such evidence].”).
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guaranteed by Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to
admit that evidence for any purpose given that he had been acquitted of
the related charges twelve years prior.81 Mr. Dorazio’s trial is a stark
example of the unfairness that flows from use of prior acquitted conduct
under these circumstances and it plays out just as Justice Brennan
predicted.82 More than a decade after the original trial, the defendant
was faced with the proposition of mounting a defense to entirely
different set of highly inflammatory and prejudicial allegations than the
ones for which he was on trial.83 Even if it were possible to mount a
defense under these circumstances, it is so fundamentally unfair and
contrary to any notion of due process that it never should have been
allowed.84 In response to this fundamental unfairness, the defendant
here urged the SJC to impose a limitation where introduction of evidence
from a prior acquittal “imposes on the defendant the burden of
relitigating [that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor]
and thereby increases the likelihood of an erroneous conviction on the
charged offense” Article XII demands that the Commonwealth be

81. The constitutionality under Massachusetts law of admission of prior bad acts for
which a defendant has previously been acquitted was not raised or reached in Commonwealth
v. Barboza. 76 Mass. App. Ct. 241 (2010). In any case, the contested evidence in Barboza
would still be admissible under the rule Mr. Dorazio now urges because it was relevant to the
issue of motive whether the defendant had been acquitted or convicted.
82.
‘[O]ne of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense evidence is that
the jury may convict the defendant not for the offense charged but for the extrinsic
offense. This danger is particularly great where . . . the extrinsic activity was not the
subject of a conviction; the jury may feel the defendant should be punished for that
activity even if he is not guilty of the offense charged.’ Alternatively, there is the
danger that the evidence ‘may lead [the jury] to conclude that, having committed a
crime of the type charged, [the defendant] is likely to repeat it.’
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 361-62 (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d
898, 914 (CA5 1978)).
83. The fact that it had been the subject of a trial and acquittal more than ten years
earlier worked a unique prejudice upon Mr. Dorazio. In 1998, Mr. Dorazio waged a vigorous
and full-throated defense of the CEC allegations, developing exculpatory evidence through
investigation and cross-examination at trial. Mounting an equally vigorous defense in 2010
was made virtually impossible due to the passage of time. And, of course, there was no record
of testimony from the 1998 trial, undermining any real opportunity for Mr. Dorazio to
meaningfully confront and cross-examine witnesses who appeared in both 1998 and in 2010.
See State v. Darling, 419 P.2d 836, 843 (Kan. 1966) (quoting State v. Little, 350 P.2d 756,
763-64 (Ariz. 1960) (“[W]here the significance of such evidence must, if the doctrine of res
judicata or collateral estoppel is to be given any effect, be determined in the light of the record
and verdict of the former trial, evidence of such former offense tends to become remote,
speculative or confusing.”)).
84. Accord McMichael v. State, 638 P.2d 402, 403 (Nev. 1982) (“[C]onsiderations of
fair play underlying the double jeopardy principle militate strongly against the evidence’s
admissibility.”).
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collaterally estopped from introducing such evidence.85
C. Collateral Estoppel, Double Jeopardy, and Fundamental Fairness
In theory, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is an application of the
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy and prevents the
relitigation of issues already decided in earlier proceedings. This
protection can be afforded to the criminal defendant seeking to suppress
404(b) evidence of previous crimes for which he has been acquitted. But
in practice, and despite Justice Stewart’s admonition in Ashe “that the
rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the
hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book,
but with realism and rationality,”86 the protection relative to 404(b)
evidence was effectively gutted by the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Dowling v. United States. That case held that acquittal did not create a
per se bar against the use of the alleged acquitted conduct where “it is
presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of
proof.”87
Dowling did not purport to overrule Ashe, but did clarify that in
order to avail himself of the constitutional protection of the collateral
estoppel doctrine it is the defendant who bears the burden of
“demonstrat[ing] that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose
was actually decided in the first proceeding.”88 In essence, although the
Court did not explicitly hold that collateral estoppel could never be
relied upon to preclude the introduction of 404(b) evidence of crimes of
which the defendant had previously been acquitted,89 it created a
virtually unscalable procedural obstacle to its use. As presaged by
Justice Stevens in the Ashe decision, the Court’s “more technically
restrictive” decision in Dowling “simply amount[ed] to a rejection of the
85. Com. v. Shagoury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 590 (1978). The United States Supreme
Court has held that because of the different standard of proof, the introduction of such
evidence does not violate the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 351 (1990). See
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 365-57 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord
State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787 (N.Car. 1992).
86. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
87. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990).
88. Id. at 350 (1990).
89. Id. at 343-54 (Justice Brennan’s dissent presumes that the Court did presumptively
say collateral estoppel wasn’t available to contest admission of 404(b) evidence, but the fact
that the majority (Justice White) engaged the inquiry regarding whether the defendant in
Dowling had met the burden suggests that its holding did not go as far as Brennan feared and,
in any case, there is nothing in the majority’s reasoning regarding the differing standards of
proof which would negate the constitutional impropriety of allowing relitigation of something
that must have been decided by the previous jury, regardless of the standard.)
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rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case
where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of
acquittal.”90
As articulated in Ashe,
Where the prior proceeding against the defendant results in a general
verdict of acquittal, the court must examine the evidence, pleadings
and other relevant material from the prior proceeding to determine
whether a rational jury could have grounded their verdict upon some
issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
91
consideration in the later proceeding.

Unfortunately for Mr. Dorazio, there no longer existed in 2010 any
detailed record of his 1998 trial, and this was the case precisely because
he was acquitted. Because there was no conviction to appeal, there was
no need to ever produce a transcript of the trial and the court
stenographers’ notes of the trial were ultimately lost.
Under circumstances such as those in Dorazio, where a defendant
bears the burden of proving that his earlier acquittal necessarily
determined that he did not commit the acts now being offered as
evidence in a trial on different charges, and where no record of the
acquittal exists there exists, it is fundamentally unfair for the evidence to
be introduced. This is especially so in the case of sexual crimes against
children where the alleged acts (whether of the crime for which the
defendant now faces trial or the earlier similar alleged acts) are so highly
inflammatory that the danger of unfair prejudice is extraordinarily high.
This last point is arguably more pertinent to the 404(b) balancing of
probative value and unfair prejudice, but should also weigh in the
application of a due process analysis of fundamental fairness.
Ultimately, though the case presents the SJC an opportunity to articulate
under Article XII a broader protection than the Fifth Amendment now
affords after Dowling, it is more likely that the simple, fact-specific
promise of a fair trial guaranteed by Article XII will offer the defendant
here greater opportunity for relief.
CONCLUSION
Massachusetts has a significant history of steadfastly protecting the
rights of the criminally accused where federal law has failed or ceased to
do so. The two cases considered in this article present the SJC with

90. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
91. Commonwealth v. Shagoury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 589-90 (1978) (citing Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
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opportunities to parse defendants’ rights carefully, and to find that those
rights are protected by core principles established in the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. Regardless of the Court’s ruling, the issues allow
practitioners of criminal law to consider fine points of procedure and
principle that carry important lessons and important consequences for
defendants.
Police officers have a significant advantage over the people they
question: officers are in a position of power; they are up to date on
existing information in a case; and they are frequently more familiar
with the law than many of the individuals they encounter. This last
fact—that police have better general knowledge about the rights a
suspect does or does not have—is often used by police to their own
advantage (and, in many cases, to the detriment of the person being
questioned). It is against the interest of the Commonwealth and its
citizens to allow police to create an environment in which individuals
believe they may be in custody, inform individuals of their rights,
request that they waive those rights, and then attempt to deprive an
individual of those rights through misrepresentation or obfuscation. For
this reason, Massachusetts courts should interpret the provisions of
Article XII to offer protection to suspects as soon as Miranda warnings
are read.
Similarly, the right to a fair trial dictates that once a person has been
acquitted of acts in the distant past, they are not forced to relitigate their
innocence a second time in a different trial. This is particularly true
where the acts alleged are of a highly inflammatory nature and where the
hearts and minds of juries may be swayed by their emotional response to
evidence, and not the facts of the case. And, perhaps more troubling, it
should not be allowed when the extensive, obviously exculpatory
evidence that had been previously adduced at a trial resulting in acquittal
cannot be or is not provided to the defendant and the trial judge prior to
its use. The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights should prevent a
defendant from having to prove, for a second time, that he is innocent of
a crime for which he has already been acquitted in order to demonstrate
his innocence in a later trial. The due process protections of Article XII
would otherwise be abrogated unfairly.

